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One of the fundamental tasks of medieval kings was to be a peacemaker, 
that is, to settle disputes and to prevent new ones from arising. The later medieval 
kings of France, whose councilors probably thought more about kingship than 
anyone else would ever care to, took this task very seriously. Throughout the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the kings of France presented themselves to 
the world and to their subjects as arbiters of discord and guardians of peace. They 
did this through their personal work and that of their administrators and institu-
tions in settling conflicts, but they also proceeded prescriptively by promulgating 
prohibitions or limitations of non-royal warfare. These ordinances outlawing the 
so-called “private” wars of nobles and other magnates have been considered, most 
notably by Aryeh Graboïs, as the culmination of a centuries-long development in 
the maintenance of order, one that began with the Peace of God Movement around 
the millennium and evolved into a royally directed program in the reigns of Louis 
VI and Louis VII.1 
But if development and change have been observed in the ideas and practices 
intended to maintain peace from the eleventh to thirteenth centuries, this group of 
ordinances has not received as nuanced a treatment. Traditionally, in an approach 
that dates from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, these texts were consid-
ered a single body of legislation representing a coherent and consistent ideological 
program directed by the crown.2 Yet, these ordinances were issued over the course 
of more than a century, during which time eight kings held the scepter of France.3 
Moreover, as Raymond Cazelles has argued, there is considerable evidence for 
disjuncture among these texts. Indeed, Cazelles went so far as to assert that the 
ordinances against non-royal warfare were not at all indicative of a consistent pro-
gram but rather only ad hoc, unconnected measures meant to deal with temporary 
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situations.4 His take on the ordinances has been lauded as a refreshing counterpoint 
to the supposedly “statist” bias of much of French institutional historiography.5 
Yet, although it is true that the scholarship to which Cazelles was reacting partook 
of an anachronistic understanding of law in the Middle Ages, a closer look at the 
texts suggests that he went too far to the other extreme. 
The ordinances are a heterogeneous mix of documents. While some of them 
do seem to have been measures of momentary political expediency, others evince 
a conscious connection to previous legislation and to the policies of predecessor 
kings. Those that do exhibit interrelatedness, however, do not manifest a consistent 
ideological program. Rather from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fourteenth century, 
the intellectual content of peace-keeping prohibitions underwent extensive modifica-
tion. Although early efforts under Louis IX inherited much from the ideological and 
administrative aspects of the Peace and Truce of God, his successors, particularly 
Philip IV and John II, increasingly deemphasized the sacral aspects of peace even 
as they found new rationales for peacekeeping that inhered in new political realities 
and newly elaborated theories of kingship and governance.
The reign of Louis IX is considered a foundational period in the history of 
royal French peace-keeping. Louis was, of course, famous for his attention to the 
settlement of disputes and the maintenance of peace, at least within Christian lands.6 
He also issued the first extant ordinance indefinitely prohibiting warfare in France, 
a text dating from January 1258 that outlawed guerrae omnes as well as arson, 
and disturbances to carts and to agricolae who work with carts or plows.7 Those 
who transgressed this prohibition were to be punished as peace-breakers (fractores 
pacis) by the king’s officer and the bishop-elect of le Puy-en-Velay.8 This is not 
a long document, but it is suggestive of a few of the intellectual and institutional 
features of this early moment in royal normative peace-keeping. In some ways, it 
represents a new step for the French crown, as Graboïs asserted: Whereas in the 
twelfth century, most notably at the Councils of Soissons and Reims in the 1150s, 
kings had limited violence in conjunction with ecclesiastical gatherings,9 Louis IX 
promulgated this text as a simple royal act on the basis of his authority as king. And 
while the long tradition of peace that ran from the Council of Charroux in 989 to 
the pronouncements of Louis’s twelfth-century predecessors focused on violence 
and peace as broad categories, the ordinance of 1258 specifically engages with 
violence’s most politically troubling form, that is, war (guerra).
However, both in this ordinance and in the other evidence we have for peace-
keeping in the reign of Louis IX, there is much more evidence for consistency with 
the past than for change. First of all, Louis’s ordinance echoes the characteristic 
concern for peasants (agricolae) and their instruments (carrucae and aratra) that 
was a defining aspect of the Peace of God and which also featured in the measures 
taken by his predecessors.10 In addition, although this text is a regalian ordinance, 
rather than a joint secular/ecclesiastical effort, we can tell from the mandate for its 
execution, in which the seneschal of Beaucaire was instructed to aid the bishop-
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elect of le Puy-en-Velay in keeping peace in his lands, that ecclesiastical concerns 
and ecclesiastical efforts played their part in the formulation and enforcement of 
this measure. 
Expanding our view beyond this ordinance to two other sources for the 
maintenance of order in Louis’s reign—one an ordinance of Alphonse of Poitiers, 
Louis’s brother in conjunction with whom Louis ruled Southern France, and the 
second a mandate from the reign of Philip III that recalls his father’s definition of 
peace-breaking—there is further evidence that the intellectual and administrative 
character of peace-keeping in Louis’s reign incorporated, rather than broke with, 
previous tradition. Alphonse’s ordinance, which dates from a few months after 
Louis’s death, but which can still be considered evidence for Capetian policy at 
this time, seeks to prevent cavalcades (cavalcatae, a frequently used synonym 
for guerrae) and other violence and orders that those who disobeyed be punished 
“according to the statutes of the Peace of Paris.”11 The Peace of Paris was the 1229 
treaty that ended the Albigensian Crusade, but the statutes to which Alphonse’s 
ordinance refers are probably those of a council at Toulouse that took place later 
that year. This council provided some of the guidelines for the future governance 
of Languedoc as it passed into Capetian hands. It was a joint church/crown effort, 
and it was heir to some of the more expansive ideas about the nature of peace that 
pervaded the peace efforts of earlier centuries. Some scholars, most notably H. E. 
J. Cowdrey and Roger Bonnaud-Delamare, have argued that peace in the Peace 
and Truce of God meant not just the absence of physical violence, but also freedom 
from the other afflictions of humanity, such as disease, famine, and heresy.12 The 
council at Toulouse, according to which the new Capetian rulers ordered violence 
punished, was informed by this broader understanding of peace; it defined not 
only those who made war (moverunt guerram) as fractores pacis, but also those 
who espoused heresy.13 
In addition to the evidence for continuity with prior tradition provided by 
Alphonse’s ordinance, a mandate that Philip III sent to southern royal officers in 
1274 shows that Louis had adopted older peace structures as well as concepts. The 
mandate, which relates guidelines on peace breaking practiced by “our greatly 
cherished lord and father, Louis, king of the French”14 orders that peace breakers 
to be handed over either to an ordinary judge or to an officer called a paciarius.15 
The paciarius, as Thomas Bisson has shown, was an office that had developed out 
of baronial and clerical peace initiatives in the early thirteenth-century South just 
prior to the Albigensian Crusades.16 Apparently this pre-Capetian peace-keeping 
institution had survived the upheavals of the Crusade period to be made use of 
by the South’s new masters. In so many ways, then, Louis IX’s reign saw neither 
intellectual nor institutional innovations in peace-keeping, but rather incorporated 
ideas and practices for the maintenance of peace that had been developed at an 
earlier remove.
However, ordinances from the reign of Louis grandson, Philip IV, sug-
gest significant changes in the way the crown thought about and went about the 
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suppression of violence. In the twenty-nine years of his reign, Philip IV, often known 
as Philip the Fair, issued six acts limiting or prohibiting non-royal warfare. The 
most important of these were his edicts of 1297 and 1314 in which he prohibited all 
non-royal wars for the duration of his own wars, and those of 1304 and 1311, which 
prohibited warfare altogether. Philip sought legitimacy from the past, particularly 
from his grandfather, Louis IX, whom he had had sainted,17 and his ordinances 
against non-royal warfare evidence this preoccupation. In his ordinance of 1304, 
Philip invoked the example of “Saint Louis, the distinguished late Confessor-King 
of the French” as precedent for his prohibition of warfare and associated violence. 
Philip’s link with his illustrious predecessor was more than nominal. Philip con-
tinued to conceive of war not as or not just as a category unto itself but as part of a 
constellation of acts that could all be considered peace-breaking.18 Like his father, 
Philip III, Philip IV also sought to follow Louis’s definition of peace-breaking in 
the South, using exactly the same description, almost verbo ad verbum, as had 
his father in a mandate to his southern officers.19 There is much, too, in Philip the 
Fair’s ordinances, particularly that of 1304, that draws from earlier peace-keeping 
traditions. Philip’s ordinances evince a concern for peasants consonant with that 
of Louis. Like Louis he forbade not just war, but also assaults against agricolae 
(farmers) and aratores (those who plow).20 Indeed, in the known manuscript copy 
of the 1304, the text is rubricated “letters of safeguard for French farmers” (litteres 
(sic) salvagardium agricolarum francarum).21
But in other ways, Philip’s prohibitions mark a radical departure from the 
work of his forbearers. In the first place, although Philip was still concerned with 
the maintenance of peace, in the intervening decades, the field of meaning indicated 
by the word pax had narrowed. When Philip’s ordinances speak of peace, they do 
not refer, as Louis’s may, to universal right relations among people, between God 
and humanity, and between humanity and nature. Rather they speak of turbatores 
pacis and of pax et quies 22 as we might speak of disturbers of the peace and of 
peace and quiet, peace there meaning simply our normal tranquil state and the 
absence of violence. But as the concept of peace became narrower and in some 
sense less sacral, at the same time Philip’s ordinances articulated an innovative 
concern with the common good. The exposition of the 1297 ordinance forbidding 
non-royal wars during the king’s wars explains that this measure had been taken 
“for the common benefit and the necessity of the realm” (pro communi utilitate & 
necessitate regni), while the 1304 ordinance was formulated “for the prosperous 
state of our realm” (ad statum prosperum regni nostri).23 By 1311, the res publica 
had even made an appearance. Philip’s ordinance forbidding warfare from that year 
warns that non-royal warfare was in periculum Reipublice.24 The desacralization 
of peace also extended to the administration of peace-keeping. Whereas Philip the 
Fair’s father, and presumably his grandfather as well, instructed their officers to 
allow either an ordinary judge or a paciarius to handle cases of peace-breaking, 
Philip IV’s mandated his officers to hand the peace-breaker over either to “our 
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people” (ad manum gentium nostrarum) or to an ordinary judge.25 Apparently by the 
beginning of the fourteenth century, the paciarii, whom the Capetians had inherited 
from the old peace associations of the South, had disappeared, fully replaced by 
the king’s administrators.
Yet, if in some ways Philip’s ordinances articulate a more secular vision of 
order than those of Louis IX, Philip IV and his councillors also strongly believed 
that the maintenance of the public good was a task entrusted to the king by God. 
The most important innovation made by Philip’s ordinances was to present and to 
justify the prohibition of non-royal warfare as a divinely ordained regalian right 
and duty. Far more than his predecessors’ strictures against violence, Philip the 
Fair’s statutes draw an explicit connection between kingship and the elimination 
of large-scale, organizaed violence. The 1304 ordinance, which Philip’s biogra-
phers have considered a turning point in his ideology of governance,26 elucidates 
this connection most fully. The ordinance explains that prohibiting warfare and 
associated behaviors “befits the office of royal dignity,” and that it is intended to 
dissuade people from taking vengeance into their own hands, when they ought to 
defer to kings and princes.27 Philip’s authority as king thus justifies him in abolishing 
custom contrary to his wishes; any such custom, the ordinance says, “ought rather 
be called corruption” (consuetudine, quin potius corruptela).28 
But Philip’s authority as king, his authority over violence, did not just inhere 
in his secular office. As the ordinance outlines, this authority had been delegated 
to him by God: The ordinance was a way of “address[ing] the grave dangers to 
the people and things entrusted to us by God.” And the kings and princes who are 
to arbitrate grievances have been “divinely deputized” (divinitus deputati) for this 
task. So while Louis IX had inherited ideas and structures from the Peace and Truce 
of God, Philip IV added to and modified this inheritance, bringing in new concepts 
of order and kingship, which served not just to explain the prohibition of warfare 
but also to justify the king’s right to make such prohibitions.
After Philip the Fair’s death in November 1314, there is a gap in the source 
record. It is certain that Philip’s successors also promulgated ordinances against 
non-royal warfare. Evidence from the judicial registers of the Parlement de Paris 
demonstrates that both Philip V and Philip VI each issued at least two general or-
dinances prohibiting warfare, though if copies any of them survived the centuries, 
they have not yet been located.29 However, for the reign of John II, which spanned 
the years 1350-1364, two general ordinances on warfare are still extant, in addition 
to several more specific measures tied to particular regions or circumstances. The 
first of these general statutes, promulgated in December 1352, prohibited non-royal 
war during the renewal of France’s war with England, while the second, issued in 
October 1361, forbade non-royal warfare altogether.
Like Philip IV before him, John II, often known as John the Good, considered 
his normative measures against non-royal warfare to be a continuation of the peace-
making work of his predecessors. His peace promulgations explicitly referred to 
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the prohibitions of his own father, Philip VI (these are among the ordinances that 
seem to be no longer extant), and, like Philip the Fair, John at one point invoked the 
example of his more illustrious ancestor, Saint Louis.30 However, in truth John II’s 
ordinances were very different from those of Louis and Philip the Fair, though some 
of the trends incipient in Philip’s ordinance seem here to have come to fruition. 
To begin with, in John’s ordinances, certain ideas about kingship and gover-
nance that had influenced Philip IV’s statutes underwent significant development 
and elaboration. John has generally been considered a much weaker king than 
Philip IV and no doubt in practical terms this judgment is fair enough. However, 
as regards the ideological underpinnings of kingship with relation to the suppres-
sion of violence, John’s ordinances against warfare not only affirmed the concepts 
expressed in Philip’s ordinances, but also developed them far more fully. Like 
Philip, John claimed the right to annul contrary custom, prohibiting warfare in 
1352 “notwithstanding any whatsoever privileges, customs, and uses or local 
observances”31 and making a very similar statement in the ordinance of 1361.32 
But whereas Philip found it necessary, particularly in the 1304 ordinance, to give a 
long, complicated exposition of the basis for his power, in John’s day, his statutes 
could simply sketch the position. When John prohibited non-royal warfare for 
the first time in 1352, he seems not to have needed to explain, as Philip had that 
“Kings and Princes are divinely deputized for the execution of justice on earth,” 
or that he wanted “justice . . . to be expeditiously administered to everyone so that 
no one might dare to claim law or vengeance unto himself.” Instead, the statute’s 
exposition merely relates that the king has decided on this measure “with all right 
and reason” (omni jure . . . ac ratione). 
In John’s ordinances one also sees concepts that while certainly not unfamil-
iar in Philip the Fair’s reign, were nonetheless not articulated in his ordinances as 
being germane to the suppression of warfare. In John’s ordinances, it is clear that 
kingship has begun to be thought about as an abstraction that existed apart from 
the king himself. For the first time, the ordinances speak not just of the king, but 
also of the crown, a corporate, institutional body that includes the king but is not 
identical with him.33 And John’s 1361 ordinance argues that the pursuit of war by 
the king’s subjects not only caused physical damage to the aggressor’s opponents 
and to innocent bystanders, but that it also damaged the king himself in some ab-
stract way. Non-royal warfare and the violence associated with it were said to be 
en lesion de Nous & de notre Seignourie & Souverainnete.34 That is, “prejudicial 
to us, to our lordship, and our sovereignty.” Philip the Fair and his councilors had 
no doubt considered his right to suppress warfare to be that of a sovereign, but 
that this sovereignty could be harmed by violence never made an appearance in 
Philip’s normative pronouncements on warfare. One could certainly read this idea 
between the lines, but it is never articulated in so many words.
Yet, if ideas about kingship in relation to violence had gained in abstrac-
tion and sophistication as compared to those of Philip, they had also lost much of 
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the sacral character that the authors of Philip’s statutes believed to have imbued 
kingship. In the 1361 ordinance, John did at one point invoke God’s aid in sup-
pressing violence, saying that he wished to govern the realm in peace a l'aide de 
notre Seigneur, but this is more of a pious aside than an ideological formulation. 
Neither the ordinance of 1361, nor any of his other ordinances suggest that the 
suppression of warfare was in any way his divinely appointed task. It seems to 
have been assumed that John’s right to quell disorder simply inhered in his rights 
as king, and his ordinances are silent as to the ultimate source of these rights and 
of that office.
The desacralization or non-sacralization of kingship apparent in John’s 
ordinances is paralleled by the conception of order evinced in these texts as little 
more than the absence of illicit violence. Like Philip the Fair, John’s main interest 
in establishing or re-establishing order was for the common good. When John’s 
ordinances speak of peace, it is peace of a very mundane sort: “peace and tranquil-
ity” and “peace in our realm” are the two formulations found in the 1361 ordinance. 
And like those promulgated under Philip, John’s ordinances also use the term res 
publica to describe the political community harmed by uncontrolled warfare. His 
ordinance of 1352 says that such violence was “an injury, scandal, and a danger for 
us, for the whole realm and republic and for all the subjects and inhabitants of our 
kingdom.”35 Another statute issued a year later explained that the king considered 
the measure to have been taken “for the good of the republic, the protection of the 
country and of the inhabitants of our realm.”36 But whereas Philip maintained a 
link with the sacral heritage of peacemaking, singling out noncombatant peasants 
for special protection, in John’s ordinances, even these trappings of earlier peace 
traditions have disappeared. Although their protection had been important to his 
predecessors’ peace prescriptions, John’s ordinances never speak of agricolae, of 
plowmen, or of agricultural instruments. 
Revealingly, the people with whom John’s ordinances are most concerned 
are armed men. The ordinance of 1361 complains of “those who are absent from 
home in order to do these evils, cavalcades and assemblies & to accomplish their 
bad designs.”37 It enjoins the royal officers to order these people to return to their 
homes within a month, to dispossess those who disobey, and even to attack for-
tresses, if such people are occupying them and refuse to render them.38 Other, more 
specific ordinances issued by John around this time also speak of foreign soldiers 
who pillage and rob and of enemies and evildoers in the country.39 As this suggests, 
under John the Good France experienced a period of intense almost uncontrolled 
violence, largely from freebooting bands of pillagers who roamed the years after 
France and England made a temporary truce in 1360, but also from nobles who 
took this opportunity to pursue their own violent impulses.40 The most important 
factor motivating the crown’s efforts to limit or prohibit warfare under John the 
Good was the need to pacify the countryside in the face of this rampant disorder. 
Even more so than innovative ideas about kingship and the political community, 
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the driving impetus for peace was the maintenance of order.
In many ways, then, the concepts of peace and of the king’s rights and powers 
in relation to violence changed greatly between the reigns of Louis IX and John 
II. Certainly, the ordinances bore a relation to one another, both through conscious 
imitation and through participation in common ideas. However, while Louis’s ordi-
nances can be connected to the peacemaking efforts of his twelfth-century forbearers 
and through them to the Peace of God, both Philip IV and John II moved beyond 
this inheritance. Under Philip, and even more so under John, the suppression of 
violence became an ideological imperative of kingship. Moreover, “peace,” which 
seems to have been a somewhat broader concept in Louis’s time, increasingly be-
came synonymous with order and the maintenance of the common good. This latter 
trend reached its culmination under John II, whose kingdom had disintegrated to 
such a point that his primary concern became the restoration of order.
Notes
1  Aryeh Graboïs, “De la trêve de Dieu à la paix du roi: Étude sur les transfor-
mations du mouvement de la paix au XIIe siècle” in Mélanges offerts à René 
Crozet, 2 vols. (Poitiers, 1966), 1: 585-96. 
2  The seminal discussions are an essay by Charles du Fresne du Cange (“Des 
guerres privées et du droit de guerre par coutume,” in Glossarium mediae et 
infimae latinitatis, 10 vols. in 5 [Graz, 1954 (1678)], 10: 100-8, esp. 106-8), and 
the introductions to the first volumes of the edition of the ordinances published 
in the eighteenth century (Prefaces to Ordonnances des rois de la troisième 
race, ed. Eusèbe-Jacob de Laurière, François-Denis Secousse, et al., 22 vols. 
and supplements (Paris, 1723-1849), 1: xxv-xxxiii, 2: v-viii, 3: xvi-xvii).
3  The first known ordinance was promulgated in 1258 and the last extant one 
was issued in 1361. 
4  Raymond Cazelles, “La réglementation royale de la guerre privée de Saint 
Louis à Charles V et la précarité des ordonnances,” Revue historique de droit 
français et étranger, 4th ser., 38 (1960), 530-48.
5  Most recently, see Howard Kaminksy, “The Noble Feud in the Later Middle 
Ages,” Past and Present 177 (2002), 65-74.
6  William Chester Jordan, Louis IX and the Challenge of the Crusade: A Study in 
Rulership (Princeton, 1979), pp. 195-205; Richard W. Kaeuper, War, Justice, 
and Public Order: England and France in the Later Middle Ages (Oxford, 
1988), pp. 231-35.
7  “guerras omnes inhibuisse in regno, & incendia, & carrucarum perturbationem. 
Unde vobis districte praecipiendo mandamus, ne contra dictam inhibitionem 
nostram guerras, aliquas, vel incendia faciatis, vel agricolas qui serviunt car-
rucis, seu aratris, disturbetis” (Ordonnances des rois, 1: 84). 
  From God’s Peace to the King’s Order                                                                                     27
8  “damus Senescallo nostro [Bellicadri] in mandatis, ut fidelem & dilectum 
nostrum G. Aniciensem Electum juvet fideliter & attente, ad pacem in terra 
sua tenendam, & fractores pacis, prout culpa cujuscumque exigit, puniendos” 
(ibid. The edition given in the Ordonnances des rois lacks “Bellicadri,” which 
is found in the only manuscript source that I know of, Bibliothèque nationale 
de France MS Latin 4651, fol. 74v). For the probability that “G. Aniciensem 
Electum” referred to Guy Foucois, bishop-elect of le Puy and former councilor 
to the king see Ferdinand Lot and Robert Fawtier, Histoire des institutions 
françaises au moyen âge, 3 vols. (Paris, 1957-62), 2: 245-46.
9  Graboïs, “paix du roi,” pp. 592-95. The council of Soissons in 1155 enjoined 
both temporal and spiritual authorities to enforce its canons: “si qui essent 
violatores ordinatae pacis, de eis ad posse nostrum justitiam faceremus. In 
pacem istam juraverunt, Dux Burgundiae, Comes Flandriae, Comes Henricus, 
Comes Nivernensis, et Comes Suessionensis, et reliqua baronia quae aderat. 
Et clerus similiter, archiepiscopi, et episcopi, et abbates, ante sacras reliquias 
et in visu totius concilii, hanc ex parte sua pacem totis viribus se tenere prom-
iserunt” (Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, 24 vols. [Paris, 
1737-1904], 14: 387-88. Hereafter this edition is cited as HF). That of Reims 
in 1157 was convened primarily to deal with Church business (J.D. Mansi, 
Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio, 31 vols. [Graz, 1960-62 
(1759-98)], 21: 843-46). 
10  Jean Richard, Saint Louis: roi d'une France féodale, soutien de la Terre 
sainte (Paris, 1983), pp. 326-27. The second canon of the first Peace Statutes, 
constituted at the Council of Charroux is entitled “Anathema res pauperum 
diripientibus” (Mansi, XIX: 90). Royal involvement in peace statutes in the 
twelfth century maintained the agrarian character of peace-keeping. The Coun-
cil of Soissons guaranteed a peace of ten years to “omnes agricolae, armenta 
similiter et greges” (HF, 14: 387-88).
11  “Super eo quod in terra domini comitis in Tolosano & Albigesio cavalcate, 
arma portata, gentes occise & multa dampna data sunt & fiunt de die in diem, 
senescallus requirat barones . . . ne ipsos malefactores recipiant vel sustineant. 
. . . Si barones vel alii juridictionem habentes in hoc deliquerint, secundum 
statuta pacis Parisiensis a senescallo puniantur.” (Claude Devic and Jean-Joseph 
Vaissete, eds., Histoire générale du Languedoc, rev. ed. by Auguste Molinier, 
et al., 16 vols. (Toulouse and Paris, 1868-1905), 8: 1715-23).
12  Roger Bonnaud-Delamare, “Fondement des institutions de paix au XI siècle,” 
in Mélanges d’histoire du moyen âge dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen 
(Paris, 1951), pp. 19-26, and H.E.J. Cowdrey, “The Peace and Truce of God 
in the Eleventh Century,” Past and Present 46 (1970), 42-67. See also the dis-
cussion in Frederick S. Paxton, “History, Historians, and the Peace of God” in 
The Peace of God: Social Violence and Religious Response in France around 
the Year 1000, ed. Thomas Head and Richard Landes (Ithaca, NY, 1992), pp. 
28 Justine Firnhaber-Baker
27-34. For heresy as part as peace-breaking (so defined in the Third Lateran 
Council in 1179), see Thomas N. Bisson, “The Organized Peace in Southern 
France and Catalonia (c. 1140-1223)” in Medieval France and her Pyrenean 
Neighbors: Studies in Early Institutional History (London, 1989), p. 223.
13  “Item statuimus ut aliquis amicitiam, familiaritatem, vel treugas non habeat cum 
fayditis [heretics], vel aliis qui guerram moverunt ” and “quod quando aliquis 
guerram moverit, fiat contra eum sacramentum de novo: quod qui procurare 
noluerit, fractor pacis reputetur: modo etiam expresse fiat sacrametum contra 
inimicos fidei atque pacis” (Mansi, 23: 202, 203).
14  “precarissimi domini & genitoris nostri Ludovici, Francorum regis” (Histoire 
générale, 10: 131-32).
15  “sive ad manus paciarii sive ad sui ordinarii manus devenerint” (ibid.). 
16  Bisson, “Organized Peace,” pp. 229, 231-33. 
17  For Philip’s near obsession with Louis IX, see Elizabeth A. R. Brown, “Philippe 
le Bel and the Remains of Saint Louis” Gazette des beaux-arts, 6th ser., 95 
(1980), 175-82. But on the contest over his memory, see Colette Beaune, The 
Birth of an Ideology: Myths and Symbols of Nation in Late-Medieval France, 
trans. Susan Ross Huston, ed. Fredric L. Cheyette (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 104-
117, and M. Cecilia Gaposchkin, “Boniface VIII, Philip the Fair, and the 
sanctity of Louis IX,” Journal of Medieval History, 29 (2003), 1-26.
18 “fractores pacis” (Ordonnances des rois, 1: 344-45), “turbatores pacis” (Or-
donnances des rois, I: 390), “pax ... turbetur” (Ordonnances des rois, 1: 492-
93).
19  Ordonnances des rois, 1: 344-45.
20  “inhibemus ... aggressiones vel invasiones agricolarum vel aratorum fieri” 
(Ordonnances des rois, 1: 390).
21  Archives municipales de Toulouse AA 4, fol. 37.
22  “Pax et quies … turbetur” (Ordonnances des rois, I: 492-93), “turbatores pacis” 
(Ordonnances des rois, 1: 390).
23  Les Olim ou Registres des arrêts rendu par la cour du roi, ed. Arthur Beugnot, 
3 vols. (Paris, 1839-48), 2: 405, and Ordonnances des rois, 1: 390, respec-
tively.
24  Ordonnances des rois, 1: 492-93.
25  Ordonnances des rois, 1: 344-45.
26  Karl Wenck, Philipp der Schöne von Frankreich, seine Persönlichkeit und 
das Urteil der Zeitgenossen (Marburg, 1905), p. 50; Elizabeth A. R. Brown, 
“Persona et Gesta: The Image and Deeds of the Thirteenth-Century Capetians, 
The Case of Philip the Fair,” Viator 19 (1988), 230. 
27 “sicut Regiae dignitatis decet officium . . . attendentes, quod ad hoc sunt jura in 
  From God’s Peace to the King’s Order                                                                                     29
medio constituta, & ad eorum defensionem & executionem justitiae Reges & 
Principes orbis terrae divinitus deputati, ut nemo sibi jus dicere, aut vindictam 
assumere audeat, sed unicuique sufficiat vigor justitiae, quam regimus, nostris 
temporibus expeditam singulis volumus ministrari” (Ordonnances des rois, 
1: 390).
28  This formulation, otherwise very unusual for the early fourteenth-century 
crown, also appears in two forms in the 1311 ordinance prohibiting warfare: 
“consuetudine quam allegant, que diecenda est potius corruptela ... consuetudo 
seu corruptela” (Ordonannces des rois, 1: 492-93).
29  1) A prohibition against local warfare for the duration of his own war made 
by Philip V, suggested by the re-issuance in 1318 of instructions for problems 
encountered because wars and judicial duels had been prohibited (Archives 
nationales de France X2a 2, fol. 7v. Hereafter all references to this archive are 
abbreviated AN).
 2) A prohibition against armed congregations and wars made by Philip V 
probably in 1320, mentioned in a judgment from May 1321 (AN X1a 5, fol. 
97v-98r).
 3) A prohibition against local warfare made by Philip VI, mentioned in four 
of Parlement’s mandates: AN X2a 3, fol. 9r-v (9 April 1335), AN X2a 3, fol. 
71r-v (29 April 1336), AN X2a 3, fol. 79v-80r (4 July 1336), AN X2a 2bis, 
fol. 2r-v (5 December 1338), and a Parlement judgment: AN X1a 8, fol. 143r-v 
(12 January 1341).
 4) A prohibition against local warfare during royal wars made by Philip VI, 
mentioned by an arrêt of Parlement on 8 April 1343 (AN X1 9, fol. 492v-94r), 
a mandate in April 1350 (AN X2a 5, fol. 186r-v), and by an ordinance of John 
II in 1352 (Ordonnances des rois, 2: 511-12).
30  John’s 1352 ordinance recalls that “defunctus inclitae recordationis carissimus 
Dominus Genitor noster, dum vivebat . . . inhibuisset expresse . . . ne quis . . . 
suis & dicti regni guerris durantibus, diffidationes quascumque, aut guerram 
facere praesumeret” (ibid.). In John’s affirmation of the Quarantaine du roi 
requiring a 40-day delay before the on-set of a war, which John—probably 
wrongly—attributed to Louis IX, “Beatus Ludovicus” is invoked once in the 
exposition, once in the deposition, and once in the final clauses (Ordonnances 
des rois, 2: 552-53).
31  “privilegiis, consuetudinibus & usibus, aut observantiis locorum, vel patriarum 
nonobstantibus quibuscumque” (Ordonnances des rois, 2: 511-12).
32  “disanz estre privilegiez ou acoustumez de user de defiances & de guerres” 
(Ordonnances des rois, 3: 525-27).
33  The 1361 ordinance declared that transgressors were to be considered “rebelles 
contre Nous & la Coronne” (Ordonnances des rois, 3: 525-27).
30 Justine Firnhaber-Baker
34  ibid.
35  “periculum nostri ac totius regni, & Reipublicae, omniumque subditorum & 
incolarum Regni nostri” (Ordonnances des rois, 2: 511-12).
36  “pro bono rei publicae, tuitioneque patriae, ac habitantium in dicto Regno 
nostro” (Ordonnances des rois, 2: 552-53).
37  “aucuns qui se absentent de leurs domiciles, pour lesdiz maulx, chevauchees 
& assemblees faire, & leurs mauvaises volentes accomplir” (Ordonnances des 
rois, 3: 525-27).
38  “que toutes manieres de Gens Nobles & non Nobles, Privilegiez & non Privi-
legiez ... se sont absentez ou esloignez de leurs vrais domiciles & principaux 
habitacions qu’il avoient & ont en notre Royaume, retournent & reviegnent 
en yceulz domiciles & habitacions, dedenz un mois apres ce que ces presentes 
seront publiees. . . . Et se aucuns se absentent ou ne reviennent a leursdiz do-
micilles & habitations, selon ce que ordene avons, touz leurs biens prenez en 
notre main. . . . Et se aucuns desdiz malfatteurs & rebelles sont en Forteresse 
ou aillieurs en vostre Prevoste ou ou ressort, dont prestement vous ne puissies 
avoir l’obeissance, faites commandement de par Nous a ceulz de la Forteresse 
& qui lesdiz malfaiteurs soustendront & compaigneront, que il les vous bail-
lent & rendent sanz delay. . . . Et ou cas que obeir ne vouldront, si faites tant 
par Gens d’armes & assembles de Nobles & autres, s’il est mestier, comme 
par Siege mettant devant les lieux, & par toutes autres voies contraintes que 
vous verres convenables, que la force en soit votre & que l’obeissance vous 
en soit rendue pour Nous, comme estre doit” (ibid.).
39  For example: “pour ce que pour fournir nostre Guerre, il Nous convient avoir 
des Soudoiers dehors nostre Royaume, tant de Genz de cheval comme de pie, 
lesquelz aucunes foiz pillent & robbent sur les Villes & sur les Eglises, & 
autres subgiez de nostre Royaume, & font moult de dommages & extorcions” 
(Ordonnances des rois, 3: 36); “noz ennemis & mal-veillans soient en notre 
Royaume” (Ordonnances des rois, 3: 648).
40  Analyses of this disorder tend to focus on the problems caused by the merce-
nary bands. See for example, Kenneth Fowler, The Great Companies, vol. 1 of 
Medieval Mercenaries (Oxford, 2001), and Jonathan Sumption, Trial by Fire, 
vol. 2 of The Hundred Years War (Philadelphia, 1999). There is also substantial 
evidence in the judicial records indicating that local magnates participated in 
the pillage and used the disorder for their own gain.
